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Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile

Homicide Cases
Victor L. Streib*
I.

Introduction

The exercise of discretion by key actors in the criminal justice
system is commonplace and may even be necessary for the functioning
of the process.1 Even within this framework, the discretion exercised by
the prosecuting attorney is enormous. In almost every situation, the
prosecutor's decisions concerning whether to charge and what to charge
determine the defendant's ultimate criminal liability and sentence. This
prosecutorial discretion is essentially unreviewed,2 making such
decisions critical within the criminal justice process.
This article examines prosecutorial discretion in the context of a
category of criminal cases giving rise to some of the most troubling
societal issues, cases involving homicides committed by juveniles.3 The
* Professor of Law; Ohio Northern University College of Law. In the spirit of full
disclosure of sources of possible bias, readers should be aware that the author served
either as defense co-counsel or defense consultant in the three cases used as examples
herein. The author is pleased to acknowledge the excellent research and writing
contributions to this article by Matthew Alan Skeens, currently a law student in the class
of 2006 at the Ohio Northern University College of Law. This article is based
substantially upon the author's paper written for the Criminal Procedure Discussion
Forum at the Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville, held on November 13,
2004.
1.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

678-680 (2004) [hereinafter LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]; see also Carolyn B.
Ramsey, The DiscretionaryPower of "Public" Prosecutorsin HistoricalPerspective,39
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1308, 1311 (2002).
2. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1 at 685; Angela J. Davis, The
American Prosecutor:Independence, Power,and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV.
393, 396 (2001).
3. Throughout this article, the term "juvenile" refers to a person who is under the
age of eighteen at the time the crime in question was committed. This "under 18"
definition is now common in the United States and internationally, even though many
states may use different ages to determine how the term "juvenile" is defined and to
determine which offenders are processed in juvenile court rather than in adult criminal
court.
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phrase "kids who kill" tends to send shock waves through even the most
hardened criminal justice professionals. The younger the defendant, the
more we may focus on the fact that the defendant is just a child. The
more revolting the details of the homicide, the more we may focus on the
fact that the victim suffered a horrible, senseless death. The latter
concern may be most significant for this article, given that prosecutors
commonly identify with the family of the victim for obvious political
reasons.
The more important issue, however, is that the defendant is just a
child. As a child, that defendant cannot be lumped together with adult
offenders. The United States Supreme Court, in its recent juvenile death
penalty ruling, Roper v. Simmons,4 has once again highlighted the key
factors:
Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults
demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders.
First, ...

[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of

responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young... The second area of
difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure.... The third broad difference is that5 the character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.
For these and many other reasons, we simply should not treat
homicide by juveniles in the same manner as we do homicide by adults.
Prosecutors are on the front line in the decision-making process as to
how to handle juvenile homicide cases, so the appropriate exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in such cases is critical.
The article begins in Part II with the facts of three actual juvenile
homicide cases that vary greatly with respect to both the age of each
offender, and the sentence imposed. Part III explores the traditional
limitations on the role of prosecutors in juvenile homicide cases. Part IV
outlines ethical limitations and exhortations, on the assumption that the
highest standards of ethical and professional behavior should be expected
of prosecutors in these cases. Examples are provided in Part V of the
different approaches in various jurisdictions to the power given
prosecutors to determine the court in which these cases are to be heard.
Finally, in Part VI specific suggestions are provided for consideration by
prosecutors exercising their discretion and as a means for assessing their
4. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
5. Id. at *33-34
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decisions.
II.

Three Examples of Juvenile Homicide Prosecutions

The age of juvenile defendants seems to be a major factor in
prosecutorial decisions regarding juvenile homicide cases. Building
upon that assumption, three specific examples will serve as primary
vehicles for this discussion. The first example is that of Cameron
Kocher, a nine-year-old boy who received probation and long-term
treatment for the 1989 murder of a seven-year-old girl in Pennsylvania. 6
The second example is Nathaniel Brazill, a thirteen-year-old boy
sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison for the 2000 murder of his
middle school teacher in Florida.7 The final (and ultimate) example is
that of Christopher Simmons, a seventeen-year-old boy sentenced to
death for the 1993 murder of a woman in his neighborhood in Missouri.8
Cameron Kocher's case made national news both because of his age
and because of the decision to prosecute him in adult criminal court. 9
Kocher was only nine years old (a fourth grade cub scout) at the time he
committed his crime, but that crime certainly was horrible:
On the morning of March 6, 1989, a snow holiday from school,
Jessica Ann Carr was fatally shot while riding as a passenger on a
snowmobile owned by Mr. and Mrs. Richard Ratti, neighbors of the
petitioner [Cameron Kocher]. On that morning, petitioner had been
playing Nintendo at the Rattis' home but stopped playing when Mr.
Ratti forbade the children to play because the children had made a
mess in the kitchen. Some children, the victim included, started
riding snowmobiles but the petitioner returned home. At some point
after returning home, the petitioner procured the key to his father's
locked gun cabinet and removed a hunting rifle equipped with a
scope. He loaded the weapon with ammunition, opened a window,
removed the screen, and pointed the gun outside. The gun
discharged, striking Jessica Ann Carr in the back and fatally
wounding her. The scope of the rifle struck the petitioner's forehead
and left a visible wound. He returned the rifle to the gun cabinet and
hid the empty shell casing.
On March 8, 1989, the petitioner was arrested and charged with
criminal homicide in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County.
After being arraigned, he was released on bail to the custody of his
6. See Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1309 (Pa. 1992).
7. See Brazill v. State, 845 So. 2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
8. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183.
9. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, JO-Year-Old Boy is Charged as Adult in Fatal
Shooting of 7-Year-Old Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1989, at A6.
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parents.
The Court of Common Pleas found Cameron Kocher to be a normal
fourth grader of above-average intelligence with an above-average
school record. He was a good student who exhibited occasional
inattentiveness. He related well to others in his school, community,
and church, and he possessed an average level of maturity and
physical development. His home life was stable, close-knit, and
supportive. The child exhibited no physical, mental, emotional, or
behavioral disorders and had no previous criminal or delinquent
history. The trial court considered these factors favorable to his
application for transfer [to juvenile court].
Conversely, the trial court's analysis of the nature of the crime and
the level of criminal sophistication weighed against the petitioner's
petition for transfer. When he fired the rifle, he endangered the
driver of the snowmobile and the other children playing in the area.
His manipulation of the gun and the window, and his dishonesty
about the cut on his forehead to his parents and police reflected an
adult level of criminal sophistication and knowledge. He appeared to
show no remorse for the crime. The petitioner was quoted as saying,
"[i]f you don't think about it, you won't be sad," to one of the
neighbors' children as the victim lay dying in the Rattis' home.
These factors weighed heavily against the petitioner's petition for
transfer. 10
Nathaniel Brazill was a rambunctious thirteen-year-old on his last
day of school before summer vacation.
Unfortunately, Brazill's
excitement over the end of school turned terribly tragic:
In the early afternoon of May 26, 2000, Brazill and Michelle
Cordovaz were suspended for the remainder of the day as the result
of a water balloon fight. School counselor Kevin Hinds escorted the
two students off campus. Brazill asked Hinds what time he was
going home. Hinds indicated that he was leaving around 4:15 to
4:30 p.m. and asked why Brazill wanted to know. Brazill shrugged
and did not respond. As he was walking away with Cordovaz, Brazill
told her that he had a gun and was going to return to shoot Hinds.
Cordovaz asked: "You wouldn't do that, Nate, would you?" Brazill
answered: "Watch. I'm going to be all over the news."
On the way home, Brazill made several stops.
Near his
grandmother's house, Brazill spoke to Brandon Spann. He asked if
Spann was part of a gang or had a gun. Spann asked him why he

10.

See Kocher, 602 A.2d at 1309-1310. 1313.
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needed a gun. Brazill replied that he was "going to fuck up the
school" because of the suspension.
At his home, Brazill retrieved a gun from his bedroom. The previous
weekend, Brazill was at his grandfather's house and found the gun in
a cookie jar in his grandfather's bureau. At that time, he loaded the
gun, pulled the slide back, engaged the safety, and placed it in his
overnight bag. When Brazill left his grandfather's house, he took the
gun home with him; upon returning home, he hid the gun in his room.
Taking the gun from his bedroom, Brazill rode his bike back to
school. On the way, he stopped by his aunt's house and left a note.
Brazill entered the school grounds near the rear parking lot, a
designated teachers' area. School security officer Matt Baxter saw
him. Baxter followed him, but found only an abandoned bike. After
leaving his bike, Brazill ran to the school building. On the way, he
advised a student sitting outside to go home.
When Brazill knocked on Grunow's door, the students in the class
were already standing, because they were about to go outside. Brazill
sternly asked to speak to Rosales and Ware, who were standing on
either side of Grunow. The teacher did not allow the girls to leave
the classroom, but said that Brazill could come inside. Brazill
refused to enter the classroom. Three more times he asked to see the
girls. Each time Grunow calmly declined and told him to go back to
class.
Brazill then pulled out the gun and aimed it at Grunow's head. He
was in the hallway, approximately an arm's length from Grunow. He
backed up slightly and assumed a shooter's stance with his legs apart.
Grunow told Brazill to stop pointing the gun, but he continued to
point the gun at the teacher's head. Brazill appeared to be angry but
calm; he was not crying or shaking. Brazill pulled the slide back on
the gun. As Grunow attempted to close the classroom door, Brazill
pulled the trigger and Grunow fell to the floor, with a gunshot wound
between the eyes. A school surveillance videotape of the hallway
revealed that Brazill had pointed the gun at Grunow for IInine seconds
before shooting. Brazill exclaimed: "Oh shit," and fled.
The final example of a juvenile homicide is the one committed in
Missouri by seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons, who ultimately
became a poster child for the effort to abolish the juvenile death penalty:
In early September 1993, Simmons, then age seventeen (now 28),

11.

Brazill, 845 So.2d at 285-286.
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discussed with his friends, Charlie Benjamin, fifteen, and John
Tessmer, sixteen, the possibility of committing a burglary and
murdering someone. On several occasions, Simmons described his
planned crime: find someone to burglarize, tie the victim up, and
ultimately push the victim off a bridge. Simmons assured his friends
that their status as juveniles would allow them to "get away with it."
On September 8, 1993, Simmons arranged to meet Benjamin and
Tessmer at around 2:00 a.m. to carry out Simmons's plan. The trio
met at the home of Brian Moomey. When Simmons and Benjamin
left to commit the burglary, Tessmer returned home.
Simmons and Benjamin found a window cracked open at the rear of
Shirley Crook's home. They opened the window, reached through,
unlocked the back door, and entered the house. Simmons turned on a
hallway light; the light awakened Mrs. Crook, who was home alone.
She sat up in bed and asked, "Who's there?" Simmons entered her
bedroom and recognized Mrs. Crook as a woman with whom he had
previously had an automobile accident. Mrs. Crook apparently
recognized Simmons as well.
Simmons ordered Mrs. Crook out of bed and, when she did not
comply, Simmons forced her to the floor with Benjamin's help.
While Benjamin guarded Mrs. Crook in the bedroom, Simmons
found a roll of duct tape, returned to the bedroom, and bound her
hands behind her back. The two also taped shut Mrs. Crook's eyes
and mouth. They placed Mrs. Crook in the back of her minivan.
Simmons drove the van from Mrs. Crook's home in Jefferson County
to Castlewood State Park in St. Louis County.
Simmons parked the van near a railroad trestle that spanned the
Meramec River. When he and Benjamin began to unload Mrs.
Crook, they discovered that she had freed her hands and had removed
some of the duct tape from her face. Using Mrs. Crook's purse strap,
the belt from her bathrobe, a towel from the back of the minivan, and
some electrical wire found on the trestle, Simmons and Benjamin
bound Mrs. Crook again, restraining her hands and feet and covering
her head with a towel. Simmons and Benjamin walked Mrs. Crook to
the railroad trestle. There, Simmons bound her hands and feet
together, hog-tied fashion, with the electrical cable, and covered her
face completely with duct tape. Simmons then pushed her off the
railroad trestle into the river below. At the time she fell, Mrs. Crook
was alive and conscious. Simmons and Benjamin threw Mrs.
Crook's purse into the woods and drove the van back to the mobile
home park across from the subdivision in which Mrs. Crook lived.
Later that day, Simmons returned to Moomey's home and bragged
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12
that he had killed a woman "because the bitch seen my face."'

These three cases, involving: (1) nine-year-old Cameron Kocher;
(2) thirteen-year-old Nathaniel Brazill; and (3) seventeen-year-old
Christopher Simmons, provide examples of the range of juvenile
homicide cases that prosecutors might receive in their in-basket. Despite
the broad range of ages and circumstances, the prosecutor handled each
case the same way. The arrested child was charged with murder in adult
criminal court and faced a minimum sentence of life in prison. In the
Simmons case, the prosecutor sought the maximum sentence, the death
penalty.' 3 Did law and ethics mandate, or at least encourage, this
prosecutorial decision? Moreover, did prosecutorial discretion play a
significant role in any or all of these cases?
1II.

Traditional Limitations on the Role of Prosecutors

The principle that prosecutors have broad discretion in when to
prosecute and what charge to file "is firmly entrenched in American
law."' 4 However, the bulk of this discretion appears to be exercised:
(1) in less serious criminal cases; and (2) in cases in which prosecutions15
of the apparent perpetrators would not best serve the public interest,
both of which would rarely apply to juvenile homicide cases, except
perhaps in cases of very young offenders. A third prominent explanation
for the existence of prosecutorial discretion is the individualized
treatment of offenders at the charging stage as well as at the sentencing
stage. 16 The younger the juvenile offender is, the more persuasive the
call for individualized justice may be.
In homicide cases, the prosecutor's power to charge in criminal
court may be limited marginally by several institutional checks. The
most important is the requirement of approval of the charge by a grand
jury in the federal criminal justice system and in about a third of state
criminal justice systems.' 7 In states without the requirement of grand
jury approval, most jurisdictions require that a judge at a preliminary
hearing approve the charge.' 8 However, it appears that neither form of
approval is difficult for the prosecutor to obtain, and thus, neither is a

12.
633).
13.

Brief for Petitioner at 3-5, Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004) (No. 03-

14.

See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 680; Ramsey, supra note 1,

at 1311.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 680-68 1.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 679, 688.
Id. at 679.
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significant check on prosecutorial discretion.1 9
The sufficiency of the admissible evidence is another, more
obvious, limitation on prosecutorial charging powers. 0 Presuming that
the charge is lodged after an arrest has been made, the beginning premise
from the arrest is that probable cause exists to believe that a criminal
homicide has been committed and that this specific person committed
that criminal homicide. 2 At trial, the evidence will have to show guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, 22 so one presumes that prosecutors would
prefer that the admissible evidence rise to that level before actually
charging the arrestee.
Prosecutorial discretion includes the power not to charge even when
the evidence is overwhelming.2 3 Most knowledgeable commentators
would agree that, for the criminal justice system to function optimally,
"something less than full enforcement of the law by the prosecutor is an
absolute necessity. ' ,24 A decision not to prosecute any charge in a
provable case of criminal homicide would be extremely unusual;
however, such a decision may be made in the case of a very young
juvenile offender under the age of seven. 5 The lesser alternative to a
decision not to take any action is a decision to divert the matter into a
non-criminal program of counseling and treatment. If the participant is
responsive to the program, the criminal prosecution is never brought, but
that prosecution would proceed if the participant does not meet the
obligations of the diversion program. 26 Such a pretrial diversion program
might be the best option for the juvenile offender under the age of
thirteen or fourteen.
Despite the attractiveness of pretrial diversion programs and other
prosecutorial charging decisions resulting in less harsh treatment of
27
juvenile offenders, each of the three example cases described earlier
received the most aggressive prosecutorial action. The nine-year-old
Cameron Kocher was charged in criminal court with criminal homicide
and other related charges.28 Once charged with murder, Pennsylvania
law required that Kocher's case go to adult criminal court. 29 The
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 685-686.
See id. at 679.
Id.
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970).
23. See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 683, 686-689.
24. Id. at 679.
25. See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW, 10671072 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that the common law infancy defense draws the minimum age
line for criminal liability at age seven).
26. See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 680.
27.

See Part II, supra.

28.
29.

See Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1309, 1310 (Pa. 1992).
Id. at 1310-1311.
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prosecutor, however, obviously had the option of not charging Kocher
under that murder statute and thereby not forcing the case into adult
criminal court.
The same could be said in the case of the thirteen-year-old
Nathaniel Brazill, in which the prosecutor's decision to pursue a grand
jury indictment automatically placed the case in adult criminal court.30
Such decisions by prosecutors treat a juvenile homicide as an adult
murder, regardless of the characteristics of the offender, but such
decisions also treat nine-year-olds and thirteen-year-olds as if they have
the criminal nature of adult offenders. In the Christopher Simmons case,
the offender was age seventeen when he committed the murder, and
pretrial diversion in lieu of prosecution would not seem to have been
appropriate.
IV. Ethical and Professional Limitations and Exhortations
Prosecutors are subject to the same ethical and professional
requirements as are all other members of the bar,3 ' and they also carry
additional responsibilities unique to their office as "ministers of
justice., 32 For example, the American Bar Association's (ABA) current
set of recommended model ethics rules continues to include a targeted33
provision entitled "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.,
Particularly significant in juvenile homicide cases could be the ethical
obligation to disclose mitigating information:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall ... make timely disclosure to
the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense,
and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal .... 34
Cases in which the offender is particularly young and innocent of
previous misdeeds may commonly raise mitigating evidence or
information raising questions as to "the guilt of the accused" through
reduced mens rea due to youthfulness. Such evidence or information
would almost always be significant "in connection with sentencing" of a

30. Brazill v. State, 845 So.2d 282, 288-289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
31. An example of such ethics rules are the American Bar Association's MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2004) [hereinafter ABA MODEL RULES].
32. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 31, at R. 3.8 cmt.; see also Bennett L.
Gershman, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Truth, 14 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 309 (2001).
33. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 31, at R. 3.8.
34. Id. at R. 3.8(d).
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juvenile offender. One example of such mitigating evidence might be
the juvenile defendant's relatively minor role in the homicide, as
compared to the role played by the juvenile's older co-defendants. If the
prosecutor is charging and prosecuting the other co-defendants as well,
the prosecutor may be uniquely situated to have evidence or information
about this factor.
The most obvious mitigating factor in juvenile homicide cases is the
youth of the offender.
However, as happened in the Christopher
Simmons case, the prosecutor may use youth to argue to the jury that the
offender is even more evil and menacing: "Think about age. Seventeen
years old. Isn't that scary? Doesn't that scare you? Mitigating? Quite
the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary., 35 Justice O'Connor noted
that "the prosecutor's apparent attempt to use respondent's youth as an
aggravating circumstance is troubling ... ,36
If extension of this
argument is permitted, might not a homicidal offender age nine (Kocher)
or thirteen (Brazill) be even scarier?
Another "special responsibility" of prosecuting attorneys is to
assure that the case is not tried in the news media either by the prosecutor
or by the law enforcement agencies:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . ., except for statements that
are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the
prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement
purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a
substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law
enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an
extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor
would be prohibited from
37
making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.
The exceptions to the prohibition of public disclosures described
above allow disclosure in a criminal case of the identity, residence,
occupation and family status of the accused and, if the accused has not
yet been apprehended, the information necessary to facilitate public aid
in making that apprehension.3 8 If the case is to end up in juvenile court
rather than adult criminal court, then much of this personal information
about the juvenile offender should not be made public. 39
The
confidentiality typically required in juvenile court cases, however, does
35.

State ex. rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003), affid, 125 S.

Ct. 1183 (2005).
36.
37.

Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 31, at R. 3.8(f).

38. Id. at R. 3.6(b)(7)(i, ii).
39.

See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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not carry over to juvenile offenders charged in adult criminal court.40
In high profile juvenile homicide cases, one particularly fears that
prosecutors will be seduced by the many political advantages of playing
to the media. All three of our example cases became national as well as
local media events, featuring the prosecutors quite prominently.4 1
Indeed, given the "man bites dog" freakishness of juvenile homicides,
such cases can be expected to attract considerable media attention in
nearly every case. This leaves the prosecutor torn between keeping the
details quiet in order to protect the juvenile and his or her family, and
exploiting the details of the case in order to ride a wave of publicity into
the next election.
Another major set of rules governing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is the ABA's criminal justice standards.42 These standards
conclusively presume that prosecutors will exercise discretion and
therefore address this factor expressly: "the prosecutor must exercise
sound discretion in the performance of his or her functions., 43 A key
part of the performance of those functions is the "[d]uty of the prosecutor
is to seek justice, not merely to convict. 4 4 This standard might suggest
the rationale for a prosecutor's decision not to file charges in a case in
which the arrestee's guilt is fairly obvious. Seeking justice might lead to
a different goal in a homicide committed by a juvenile in comparison to a
similar homicide committed by an adult. The ABA criminal justice
standards also provide that the prosecutor should continue to have the
power to lodge criminal charges, albeit perhaps not total power. 45
However, they do not suggest any form of outside review of the
prosecutor's decision to charge or not to charge. Prosecutors are
expressly urged not to consider personal gain:
40.

See

THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS

TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
41. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 5-4, Forbids Execution in Juvenile

Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at A6 (Christopher Simmons case); The Oprah Winfrey
Show: Notorious Trials; Behind the Scenes; Guests Discuss Sensational Trials They
Have Been Involved In; Interview with Nathaniel Brazil (ABC television broadcast, June
11, 2004); DePalma, supra, note 9 (Cameron Kocher case). Mark Pazuhanich, the
prosecutor in the Cameron case, went on to be elected a county court judge, but
ultimately was convicted of child molestation, resigned from office, and was banned from
the bench for life. The Associated Press, PazuhanichBannedfrom Bench for Life, PENN
L. WEEKLY, Oct. 11, 2004, at 9; Joe McDonald, Pazuhanich to Face Courtfrom New
Perspective; Jury Selection to Start in Molestation Case Against Monroe Judge, THE
MORNING CALL, Jul. 11, 2004, at B1.

42.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELATING TO

THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1993) [hereinafter ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS].

43.

Id. at Standard 3-1.2(b) (emphasis added).

44.
45.

Id. at Standard 3-1.2(c).
Id. at Standard 3-3.4(a) ("The decision to institute criminal proceedings should

be initially and primarily the responsibility of the prosecutor.").
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In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no
weight to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which
might be involved or to a desire to enhance his or her record of
convictions.46
These standards also urge prosecutors to consider non-criminal
dispositions as a part of the prosecutorial discretion whether to file
criminal charges:
The prosecutor should consider in appropriate cases the availability
of non-criminal disposition, formal or informal, in deciding whether
to press criminal charges which would otherwise be supported by
probable cause; especially in the case of a first •.
offender,
the nature of
47
the offense may warrant non-criminal disposition.
Interestingly, in considering cases for this dispositional alternative, the
standards urge prosecutors to "be familiar with the resources of social
agencies which can assist in the evaluation of cases for diversion from
the criminal process. ' 48 It appears that seeking assistance from other
knowledgeable professionals in making the charging decision is raised
only here and not in cases of determining which criminal charge to bring.
If the prosecutor declines to present the maximum number of charges in
a given case, one reason may be "the disproportion of the authorized
punishment in relation to the particular offense or the offender., 49 This
standard might be particularly applicable in juvenile homicide cases,
given the youthfulness of the offender and the probability that the
harshest of criminal punishments would be inappropriate for a juvenile.
V.

Which Court Should Hear the Case?

Juvenile homicide cases combine two elements that seem not to go
together. The term "juvenile" indicates an adolescent or younger child,
and such a person would most naturally go to juvenile court. The term
"homicide" indicates the category of the most serious crimes known to
law, and such crimes would most naturally go to criminal court. So if a
"juvenile" commits a "homicide," does the case go to juvenile court or to
criminal court? This question has been the basis for an entire cottage
industry for scholars and commentators. 50
It is generally agreed that three general categories of provisions
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at Standard
Id. at Standard
Id. at Standard
Id. at Standard

50.

See, e.g, Fagan & Zimring, supra note 40, and the list of books and articles

collected

at

BARRY

3-3.9(d).
3-3.8(a).
3-3.8(b).
3-3.9(b)(iii).
C.

FELD,

CASES

ADMINISTRATION 491-493 (2d ed. 2004).

AND

MATERIALS

ON

JUVENILE

JUSTICE
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exist that permit bringing putative juveniles into adult criminal court.5 1
One category is for the legislature simply to have excluded from juvenile
court certain juveniles accused of committing certain offenses, leaving
no discretion in any prosecutor or judge if a juvenile is charged with that
offense.52 Of course, the prosecutor could choose to charge the juvenile
offender with a different (lesser) offense, avoiding that legislative
exclusion from juvenile court. If this category is the law in a given
jurisdiction, though, all homicides may be excluded, 53 leaving the
prosecutor with essentially no viable options, at least within homicide
law. This is essentially what happened in our three example cases.
Judicial waiver is a second category and would appear also to leave
little discretion in the hands of the prosecutor. Here the case must be
originated in juvenile court, but that court has the authority to waive
juvenile court jurisdiction and to transfer the case to criminal court. 4
The prosecutor's role in judicial waiver jurisdictions often is to file a
motion to transfer, without which it would be unlikely that the case
would be transferred to criminal court.5 5 Presumably the prosecutor
retains the discretion not to seek transfer through judicial waiver,
but the
56
juvenile court may take up that consideration on its own motion.
The greatest prosecutorial discretion in choosing which court hears
a juvenile homicide case exists in the states providing concurrent
jurisdiction shared by juvenile and criminal courts in serious cases,
commonly juvenile homicide cases. 57 Revealing its true nature,
concurrent jurisdiction is also known as prosecutorial waiver or
prosecutor discretion. 8 Only about a third of the states provide for this
extreme prosecutorial discretion.59 Prosecutorial discretion in these
situations is restricted only by the determination whether evidence exists
to prove the case.6 ° If so, the prosecutor has nearly a free hand to decide
whether to charge the youth in juvenile or criminal court.
Those jurisdictions that permit prosecutors to file juvenile homicide
cases either in juvenile court or in criminal court raise the most serious
See 1999 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS NAT'L REP.
52. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see FELD, supra note 50,
at 573-592.
53. See FELD, supra note 50, at 573-592.
54. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 547 (1966); see also FELD, supra note 50, at
499-571.
55. See FELD, supra note 50, at 499-571.
51.

56.

Id.

57.

Id. at 593, 613.

58. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform:
The Case for ProsecutorialWaiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
629, 632 (1994).
59. See FELD, supra note 50, at 593.

60.

Id. at 595.
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concerns about unchecked prosecutorial discretion. The consequences to
the juvenile are enormous, ranging from a community-based treatment
program to life in prison or, prior to Roper v. Simmons, 61 even the death
penalty.6 2 Even before challenging the appropriateness of permitting
such a wide range of sanctions to be imposed by the criminal justice
process, it would seem that prosecutorial discretion to launch such
prosecutions should not be the unreviewable decision of a solitary
criminal justice official.
VI. Recommendations for Prosecutors
The overriding issue in prosecutorial discretion for juvenile
homicide cases, as in perhaps almost all criminal cases, "is not discretion
versus no discretion, but rather how discretion should be confined,
structured, and checked., 63 This discretion resides almost exclusively in
the office of each local prosecutor: "The prosecution function has
traditionally been decentralized, so that state attorneys-general exercise
no effective control over local prosecutors. 64 If prosecutorial discretion
is wide-ranging and essentially unreviewed by any other agency, it seems
we would benefit from discussions of broadly accepted guidelines and
checklists for such far-reaching decisions.
Confining the prosecutor's discretion in juvenile homicide cases
could begin with establishing a reasonable minimum age for a criminal
charge to be made in an adult criminal court. This needed improvement
in juvenile homicide law must come from the legislature if we are to put
an end to the criminal prosecution of nine-year-old, fourth-grade cub
scouts such as Cameron Kocher. In fact, a minimum age of fourteen to
sixteen seems most appropriate, forever banishing the spectacle of cases
like Kocher.
The ABA criminal justice standards provide a basic framework for
prosecutorial standards and procedures:
"The prosecutor should
establish standards and procedures for evaluating complaints to
determine whether criminal proceedings should be instituted., 65 This
ABA standard goes to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the case in
court, but this theme might also lend itself to the evaluation of the unique
considerations in juvenile homicide cases regardless of the sufficiency of
the evidence.
Structuring prosecutorial discretion in juvenile homicide cases

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005).
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 683.
Id. at 685.
ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 42, at Standard 3-3.4(c).
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could be enhanced by ensuring that prosecutors receive maximum
66
information about both the crime and the juvenile offender.
Prosecutors' information about the crime is typically ample, but
information about the juvenile is often limited to his or her juvenile or
criminal record. If the horror of the crime is overwhelming, as is often
the case in juvenile homicides, then the prosecutor may be pushed
toward the logic of treating the case as an "adult crime" deserving of an
"adult punishment." The end result of this logic is an argument to a
criminal court jury that the young child sitting at the defense table is
really an adult in a child's body. The structuring of prosecutorial
discretion could also be improved by requiring a pre-charge conference
at which the prosecutor and defense counsel could discuss the pros and
cons of various possible juvenile or criminal charges that could be filed,
as well as the appropriateness of a noncriminal disposition.67
Finally, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in juvenile homicide
cases might be subjected to a special review due to the unique nature of
these cases. The youth of the offender in such cases calls for such a
special review to prevent prosecutors from handling them as they would
any homicide cases. The most obvious entity to provide this special
review would be the juvenile court judge, who is probably the
government official within the jurisdiction who has the most experience
and education about the special nature of childhood. One way to force
this review would be to require that all juvenile homicide cases be filed
first in juvenile court, and, then, if the prosecutor desires, a motion to
transfer the case to criminal court can be filed. This motion and the
transfer hearing it precipitates would be held before the juvenile court
judge, providing the special review with unique expertise that is
recommended.
In sum, it appears impossible, as well as inadvisable, to reduce
prosecutorial discretion in juvenile homicide cases to zero. However, the
intense political and media pressures on prosecutors in such cases,
combined with less than sophisticated knowledge about the personal
characteristics of juveniles, too often result in prosecutorial discretion
being exercised in a knee-jerk, tough-on-crime manner. Juveniles are not
just short adults, and the negative impact on them of this prosecutorial
choice can be much greater than for an adult offender in the same
situation. Conversely, the mere fact of their youthfulness should give us
much more hope that they will turn their lives toward positive
alternatives than we might hold out for hardened adults. In juvenile
homicide cases, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion should not be just
66. See LAFAVE,
67. Id.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note

1, at 684.
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